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Although American criminal suspects who are deaf possess the
same constitutional rights as hearing suspects, they are often denied full
protection of those rights. The criminal justice system protects the
rights of criminal suspects by guaranteeing Miranda warnings, public tri-
als, the right to confront witnesses, and the assistance of counsel. 1 These
protections, however, involve the use of spoken words that deaf criminal
suspects cannot comprehend without the aid of a sign language inter-
preter.2 Although it is not a perfect guarantee, sign language interpreta-
tion3 is essential to protect fully deaf criminal suspects' right to
* The author would like to thank attorneys Ora Schub, Robert Burns, Barbara Samuels,
and Donald Paull, as well as interpreters Tom Cunningham, Mary Mulcrone, and Shirley
Stefanski, for their valuable assistance in preparing this Comment.
1 The United States Constitution and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court
guarantee these rights. The fifth amendment provides: "No person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the Witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
Witnesses in his favor; and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court guaranteed to criminal
suspects the right to be warned effectively of their constitutional rights before in-custody in-
terrogation, and the Court guaranteed the right to assistance of counsel in Escobedo v. Illi-
nois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2 Some deaf persons competently speechread (or lipread) and speak effectively. Al-
though speechreading deaf suspects confront fewer problems in the criminal justice system
than deaf suspects who cannot speechread and are refused sign language interpreters, speech-
reading alone is inadequate protection of the rights of the deaf criminal suspect. The crimi-
nal process is not well-suited to the use of speechreading. See infra note 11.
3 The American Linguists Association has accorded American Sign Language (A.S.L.)
the status of a "language." In the United States, there are two principal forms of sign lan-
guage for the deaf: American Sign Language (A.S.L. or Ameslan) and Signed English (S.E.
or Seglish). Signed English closely follows the grammar of the English language; A.S.L.,
which has its own grammar, is more conceptual. Although many educators and hearing peo-
ple favor Signed English, A.S.L. is the language of the deaf. As a result, most deaf criminal
suspects will communicate in A.S.L. Like all languages, A.S.L. varies among different geo-
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understand the proceedings at all stages of the criminal process. 4
The deaP number about two million in America, 6 or about one
person in every 110. 7 About thirteen million Americans are hearing-
impaired,8 suffering from some form of significant hearing loss. Many
hearing-impaired people function well in society with effective use of
graphic regions, ages, educational levels, and socio-economic backgrounds of the deaf. Also,
A.S.L. is American only; the deaf in other nations use different sign languages.
4 For a short discussion of recent developments in the criminal justice system's protection
of the rights of deaf suspects, see Goldberg, Gardner & DuBow, Rights of the Deaf. Ensuring
Efective Communication, 17 TRIAL, Feb. 1981, at 39. For a discussion regarding the rights of
deaf civil defendants, see Note, Procedural Due Process.- A Deaf Defendant's Right to be Heard Should
Encompass a Right to 'Hear' Civil Trials Through Interpretation, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 867 (1980).
5 Deaf educators define "deaf person" as one in whom "the sense of hearing is non-func-
tional for the ordinary purposes of life." P. HIGGINS, OUTSIDERS IN A HEARING WORLD: A
SOCIOLOGY OF DEAFNESS 29 (1980). The state interpreting laws that define deafness vary
significantly. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242 (H) (West Supp. 1983) (one "whose hear-
ing impairment is so significant that the individual is impaired in processing linguistic infor-
mation through hearing"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.31 (West Supp. 1984) (one who "cannot
understand the proceedings or any charges made against him, or is incapable of presenting or
assisting in the presentation of his defense"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.035(1) (Vernon Supp.
1984) (one who is "incapable of adequately understanding what is said at the proceedings");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-502(2) (1983) (one whose "hearing is totally impaired or whose
hearing is so seriously impaired as to prohibit the person from understanding oral communi-
cations"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25.2402(I) (1979) (one who "cannot readily understand or com-
municate the English language"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2408(1) (West Supp. 1983)
(one whose "sense of hearing is nonfunctional for the ordinary purposes of life"); OR. REV.
STAT. § 133.515(2)(a) (1981) (one who "cannot understand the proceedings" and is "incapa-
ble of presenting or assisting in the presentation of his defense'); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-
103(a)(1) (Supp. 1983) (one who cannot understand "language spoken in a normal tone");
TEx. CODE GRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 3 8 .3 1(g) (1) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (one who has a hearing
impairment that "inhibits the person's comprehension of the proceedings").
Interestingly, many of these definitions are overly broad because they also can apply to
hearing suspects who do not speak English. See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 2(a)
(making clear that the statute applies only to those who cannot understand spoken language
"through normal auditory processes').
The definition of deafness may be crucial in determining a particular defendant's status
and rights under the state interpreting statutes. Hearing-impaired persons may not be able to
understand "language spoken in a normal tone" but might be deemed capable of "ade-
quately understanding" the English language.
6 j. SCHEIN & M. DELK, THE DEAF POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 16 (1974).
There are about twice as many deaf in the United States as there are blind. Id. at 87. In
comparison to the deaf, the blind experience significantly fewer problems in dealing with the
criminal justice system because the system depends mainly on spoken language. Telephone
Interview with Tom Cunningham, Interpreter with the Chicago Hearing Society (Aug. 24,
1982).
7 P. HIGGINS, supra note 5, at 8.
8 Id. at 33. Three kinds of hearing loss affect the hearing-impaired: 1. sensori-neural loss
(when the nerves of the inner ear do not function properly due to excessive noise, physical
damage, or genetic defects); 2. conductive loss (when ear wax, fluid, or other matter blocks the
middle or outer ear canal; such loss is often temporary and can be remedied by surgery); and
3. central loss (when the brain center that controls hearing is damaged). Medical science has
not yet developed a permanent cure for sensori-neural and central losses.
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residual hearing, speechreading, and hearing aids.9 Persons with a
slight hearing loss confront few problems in the criminal justice system
because their understanding and communication are not significantly
limited. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the "profoundly" deaf
must rely on one of the three visual means of communication: written
transcription, speechreading, or sign language interpretation.
Sign language is the most effective method of visual communica-
tion for deaf criminal suspects because sign language interpretation
gives deaf suspects a complete and simultaneous translation of the dis-
cussion.10 The deaf community increasingly uses sign language inter-
preters.11 In the criminal process, however, the use of sign language
requires a competent interpreter 12 who is familiar with the terminology
9 "Residual hearing," or the hearing that remains after loss, is an essential aid to commu-
nication for the hearing-impaired. In speechreading (or lipreading), the deaf person observes
the speaker's lip movements to decipher the words spoken. A speechreader can understand
only about one-third of the speaker's words, because only 33% of sounds have distinguishable
mouth movements. Hearing aids merely increase the volume of sound going into the ear;
they do not clarify sounds. Residual hearing, speechreading, and hearing aids, along with
extensive training and therapy, increasingly assist the profoundly deaf in a hearing society,
especially when hearing is lost after lingual development. See P. HIGGINS, supra note 5, at 29-
30; E. LEVINE, THE ECOLOGY OF EARLY DEAFNESS: GUIDES TO FASHIONING ENVIRON-
MENTS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENTS (1981).
10 Personal Interview with Mary Mulcrone, Chicago Hearing Society, in Chicago (Sept.
15, 1982).
11 Written transcription and speechreading do not provide the deaf suspect with as com-
plete a translation or with the same protections as does sign language. Because A.L.S. is a
different language, written English is not understandable for deaf persons. Written transcrip-
tion as a method of communication with the deaf criminal suspect can be costly, inefficient,
time-consuming, and ineffective. Written transcription requires writing implements and ex-
tra time for writing and reading. Moreover, the use of written transcription presumes that
the deaf criminal suspect is literate and can comprehend legal jargon. A sign language inter-
preter, on the other hand, needs no tools or extra time and often can explain legal jargon with
additional and simplified signs.
Speechreading presents similar problems when employed in the criminal process. The
effectiveness of speechreading varies according to the speed and articulation of the speaker,
the training of the deaf speechreader, and the number of different speakers the speechreader
must watch. Speechreading is ineffective at a criminal trial because the deaf defendant can-
not always identify the speaker, cannot always face the speaker, and cannot always under-
stand the legal terminology. At best, a deaf speechreader can effectively decipher only about
one-third of the spoken words. Most importantly, speechreading is ineffective for the deaf
criminal suspect who cannot speak because it is one-way communication; it presents no
means for the deaf suspect to respond. Most of the deaf speak, however, putting to rest the
old nickname "deaf-and-dumb," which is highly offensive to the deaf today. Deaf people are
not dumb. In contrast to speechreading, sign language establishes two-way visual communi-
cation with the deaf criminal suspect. Telephone interview with Tom Cunningham, Inter-
preter with the Chicago Hearing Society (Aug. 24, 1982); Personal Interview with Shirley
Stefanski, Interpreter with the Chicago Hearing Society, in Chicago (Sept. 15, 1982). See also
B. BRANSON, THE SILENT WORLD (1971); P. HIGGINS, supra note 5; L. JACOBS, A DEAF
ADULT SPEAKS OUT (1974).
12 The Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (R.I.D.) has established national standards of
competency and ethics for interpreters. The R.I.D. issues licenses for interpreters, including
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and procedures of the criminal justice system.
The federal government and thirty-nine states now provide sign
language interpretation in some criminal proceedings as a means of
communication with deaf criminal suspects.' 3 These recent laws indi-
cate a growing public and political awareness of the problems of the
handicapped, evidenced by the enactment of a large body of civil rights
laws for the handicapped within the past decade. 14 Yet, the present
laws that provide for interpreting in the criminal justice system do not
sufficiently protect deaf criminal suspects' right to understand the pro-
ceedings at all stages of the criminal process. 5
This Comment argues that deaf criminal suspects possess the right
to understand and participate in all criminal proceedings and that this
right can be protected only when a qualified interpreter is provided.
Presently, the criminal justice system's response to this need is inade-
quate. Thus, this Comment suggests improvements needed in the inter-
preting laws and within the criminal justice system to ensure full
protection of deaf criminal suspects' right to understand the proceedings
at all stages of the criminal process.
I. THE RIGHT TO UNDERSTAND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The United States Constitution does not provide deaf criminal sus-
pects with an absolute or specific right to an interpreter. The Constitu-
tion does, however, grant all suspects, hearing and deaf, the rights to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 16 to be silent,' 7 to
the Comprehensive Skills Certificate (C.S.C.), the Legal Skills Certificate (L.S.C.), and the
Reverse Skills Certificate (R.S.C.). The licenses require minimum training levels and hours of
interpreting experience in different interpreting situations.
The R.S.C. interpreter, often a deaf person, is trained to translate American Sign Lan-
guage (A.S.L.) for deaf persons with low grammatical skills. R.S.C. interpreting therefore
requires two interpreters: one to interpret spoken words into A.S.L. and one to interpret
A.S.L. into the grammatically simpler signs and concepts.
The R.I.D. requires L.S.C. interpreters to take intensive training courses and examina-
tions in legal practices and procedures. About 100 interpreters in the United States have the
L.S.C. certificate. These L.S.C. interpreters are the most qualified to interpret at any stage of
the criminal process because they have training specifically geared towards interpreting in the
criminal justice system. Personal Interview with Mary Mulcrone and Shirley Stefanski, Inter-
preters with the Chicago Hearing Society, in Chicago (Sept. 15, 1982).
13 See infia note 23.
14 See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1973) (providing the handi-
capped, inter alia, equal access to public buildings and equal opportunities for employment).
15 While the state statutes vary widely in focus, coverage, and effectiveness, many of the
interpreting laws contain major weaknesses: they provide for interpreters only at trial, they
require the deaf person to compensate the interpreter, and they lack standards of training and
competency for interpreters. See infra text accompanying notes 142-68.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, supra note 1.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. V, srupra note 1.
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the assistance of counsel, 18 to confront adverse witnesses,' 9 and to due
process of law.20 Courts have protected these rights in cases involving
deaf and foreign-language-speaking defendants by providing a right to
foreign-language interpreters at the trial stage of the criminal process. 21
Courts thus have attemped to protect defendants' right to understand
the proceedings at trial. 22 In addition, thirty-nine states provide by stat-
ute for the mandatory appointment of sign language interpreters for
deaf criminal defendants at trial.23
18 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, supra note 1.
19 Id.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V, supra note 1.
21 In cases involving foreign-language-speaking suspects, courts have provided the right to
interpreters where the interpreters would aid the suspect's understanding in order to protect
the suspect's constitutional rights of confrontation, assistance of counsel, and due process. See
in/fa text accompanying notes 87-111.
22 In State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 121 P.2d 903 (1942), the Utah court ruled that the
defendant had a right to understand the proceedings:
[T]he defendant has the right to see the witness testifying against him and to hear
what the witness says. Are these rights more essential, or even as essential, than the right
to understand what is going on in the proceeding? Suppose a defendant were placed in a
transparent compartment where he could see all that took place, yet was deprived of
hearing what was said because all sound was cut off, could it be said that such a situation
were less than a deprivation of the constitutional right of confrontation? The purpose of
the confrontation must be to permit the defendant to be advised of the proceedings
against him.
Id. at 449-50, 121 P.2d at 905.
Likewise, in Mothershead v. King, 112 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1940), the court of appeals
affirmed the suspect's right to understand the proceedings, noting that "[t]he conviction of a
person whose infirmities are such that he cannot understand or comprehend the proceedings
resulting in his conviction and cannot defend himself against such charges, is violative of
certain immutable principles ofjustice." Id. at 1006.
23 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (West Supp. 1983) (enacted 1982); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-2101.1(a) (1977) (enacted 1973); CAL. EVID. CODE § 754(b) (West Supp. 1984)
(enacted 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-201(b) (1973) (enacted 1963); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-137k(a) (West Supp. 1982) (enacted 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8907 (Supp.
1982) (enacted 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.6063(2) (West Supp. 1983) (enacted 1980); GA.
CODE ANN. § 99-4002 [24-9-101] (a) (Supp. 1982) (enacted 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 8-1402 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (enacted 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622B.2 (West Supp.
1982) (enacted 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4352 (Supp. 1982) (enacted 1972); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 30A-410 (1980) (enacted 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-270(A) (West 1981) (en-
acted 1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48(2)(A) (Supp. 1983) (enacted 1977); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 623A (1982) (enacted 1968); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 92A (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1983) (amended 1978); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1256(1) (Callaghan 1978 & Supp.
1983) (enacted 1955); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.32 (West Supp. 1984) (enacted 1969); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 13-1-16 (Supp. 1983) (enacted 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.035(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1984) (enacted 1965); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-503(1) (1983) (enacted 1979); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25.2403 (1979) (enacted 1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.051 (1979) (enacted
1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-A-2 (Supp. 1979) (enacted 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-
9-3 (Supp. 1983) (enacted 1979); N.Y. JUD. LAw § 390 (McKinney 1983) (enacted 1972);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-2 (1981) (enacted 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-33-02(1) (Supp. 1983)
(enacted 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.14(A) (Baldwin 1982) (enacted 1973); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1278(a) (West 1958) (enacted 1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 2409(A) (West Supp. 1983) (enacted 1982); R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-5-8 (1969) (enacted 1968);
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The constitutional rights guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amend-
ments must be protected at other stages of the criminal process. All
suspects have the same right to understand the proceedings, but deaf
suspects have a physical inability to understand criminal proceedings
without the aid of a sign language interpreter. Because the Constitution
grants all criminal suspects, deaf and hearing, the same guarantees of
justice and fairness, criminal justice officials must protect deaf suspects'
rights to understand and participate in criminal proceedings while
under arrest, while standing trial, and while incarcerated.
A. PROTECTING DEAF SUSPECTS' RIGHTS UPON ARREST
Police officers face several problems when they question, arrest, or
take into custody a deaf person. They must administer Miranda warn-
ings fully and effectively, in accordance with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona.24 If they want to question deaf
suspects, they must establish communication. If they press charges, they
must inform deaf suspects of the nature and cause of the accusation.2 5
Because deaf suspects are physically unable to understand spoken Mi-
randa warnings and spoken questions, police officers must provide sign
language interpreters26 upon the arrest, questioning, and arraignment of
deaf suspects.
Miranda v. Arizona dictates that suspects "must be adequately and
effectively apprised of [their] rights" to permit them the full opportunity
to exercise the right to remain silent. 27 The warning is essential to en-
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-3-10(2) (1979) (enacted 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-
103(b)(1) (Supp. 1983) (enacted 1981); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.31(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1982) (enacted 1979); VA. CODE § 19.2-164.1 (1983) (enacted 1982); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 2.42.030 (Supp. 1983) (enacted 1973); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-7(a) (Supp. 1983)
(enacted 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 885.37 (West Supp. 1983) (enacted 1975); Wyo. STAT.
§ 5-1-109(a) (Supp. 1983) (enacted 1979).
Five other states provide for the discretionary appointment of an interpreter at the crimi-
nal trial of a deaf defendant: ALA. CODE § 12-21-131 (1975) (enacted 1965); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 606-9 (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-110 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (enacted 1962); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-35-15(b) (1982) (enacted 1953); VT. R. CRIM. P. 28 (1983) (enacted 1973).
24 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the United States Supreme
Court held that officers interrogating suspects after they have been taken into custody must
inform them of their constitutional rights: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." Id. at 444. Further, the Court indicated throughout its opinion that the warn-
ings must be full and effective. Id. at 444, 479.
25 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, supra note 1.
26 Although some authorities use written transcription to inform deaf suspects of their
Miranda rights and to question deaf suspects, this method of communication is inadequate.
See supra note 11; see also infra note 46 and accompanying text.
27 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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sure that suspects know of their privilege against self-incrimination. 28
Suspects who do not understand English must be given a translation of
the Miranda warnings that they can understand. The problem facing
deaf suspects, therefore, is twofold: they must receive a translation of
the Miranda warnings and they must obtain an adequate-that is, full
and effective-understanding of the warnings.
Criminal suspects who speak only in a foreign language face similar
problems. While courts have examined the failure of police officers to
communicate full and effective Miranda warnings to deaf suspects in par-
ticular cases,2 9 they have not directly confronted any failure to under-
stand Miranda warnings in cases involving foreign-language-speaking
suspects. In People v. Wong, 30 a California court noted that the Chinese-
speaking defendant "was properly advised of his Miranda rights and that
he voluntarily waived them, and there is nothing in the record indicat-
ing that [the defendant] did not understand the admonitions given." 3 1
In none of three other cases involving foreign-language-speaking sus-
pects did a court conclude that the suspect failed to understand Miranda
warnings.32
Several states recently have recognized by statute that deaf crimi-
nal suspects need sign language interpretation to understand Miranda
warnings fully and effectively and to be adequately informed of the na-
ture and cause of the accusation. 33 Fifteen states now provide deaf sus-
28 The Miranda Court asserted:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule
and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so
simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware
of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant
possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact
with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact ...
[A] warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures
and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in
time.
Id. at 468-69. Although giving an adequate warning is not "so simple" when the suspect is
deaf, the Court implies that an adequate warning is only one that informs the suspect.
29 See Kiddy v. City of Oklahoma City, 576 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1978); State v. Mason,
53 Or. App. 811, 819, 633 P.2d 820, 826 (1981); see also infa text accompanying notes 38-55.
30 35 Cal. App. 3d 812, 111 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1973).
31 Id. at 825, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
32 Tertrou v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 166, 509 P.2d 970 (1973) (interrogating officer took inter-
preter who interpreted Miranda warnings to defendant; statements were admissible); People v.
Guerrero, 454 N.Y.S.2d 492, 114 Misc. 2d 635 (1982) (court reversed defendant's conviction
because the State failed to notify the defendant of its intention to offer a statement given by
the Spanish-speaking defendant after officers delivered Miranda warnings in English; the court
did not discuss whether the defendant understood the warnings or whether the statement was
admissible); State v. Lavaris, 32 Wash. App. 769, 649 P.2d 849 (1982) (confessional state-
ments made before officers gave interpreted Miranda warnings to Spanish-speaking defendant
did not taint open confession made after the interpreted Miranda warnings).
33 The North Carolina statute, one of the few state interpreting laws that sets forth the
[Vol. 75
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pects with a sign language interpreter upon arrest, thereby protecting
the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation.34 Three states require police officers to procure an inter-
preter specifically to deliver Miranda warnings to deaf suspects.35 Eight
states require that statements obtained by questioning deaf suspects
without a sign language interpreter present be excluded from evidence
at a criminal trial.36 Ten states mandate the appointment of a sign lan-
guage interpreter when a grand jury examines deaf suspects. 37
Even in those states that require the police to make sign language
interpreters available, police officers do not always locate interpreters
constitutional rights of deaf suspects during arrest and interrogation, clearly protects deaf
suspects' rights:
Mhe arresting officer shall immediately procure a qualified interpreter from the
appropriate court for any interrogation, warning, notification of rights, arraignment, bail
hearing or other preliminary proceeding, but no arrestee otherwise eligible for release on
bail . . . shall be held in custody pending the arrival of an interpreter. No answer,
statement or admission taken from the deaf person without a qualified interpreter pres-
ent and functioning is admissible in court for any purpose.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-2(d) (1981) (enacted 1981).
34 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(C) (West Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-715.1(c)
(Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-201(d) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.245 (West
Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4351(e) (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 30A.400(2) (1980);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.32(2) (West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-503(3)(b)
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-A:3 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-2(d) (1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE-§ 28-33-02(2) (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2410(A) (West
Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.515(1) (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-3-10(4)
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(b)(3) (Supp. 1983).
The Georgia interpreting statute allows the arresting officer to take a statement in writing
and to interrogate the deaf suspect in writing; the arresting officer must preserve the written
questions and answers for review. GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4002 [24-1-5] (Supp. 1982). The
Florida statute allows the arresting and interrogating officers to question the deaf suspect in
writing if an interpreter cannot be located. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901-245 (West Supp. 1983).
35 ARM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(0) (West Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-2(d)
(1981); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
36 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-715.1(c) (Supp. 1983); CAL. EVID. CODE § 754() (West Supp.
1984); Ky. REV. STAT. § 30A.400(3) (1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-503(3) (c) (1983); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8B-2(d) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2410(A) (West Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(b)(3) (Supp. 1983); Tax. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22(3)(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1982).
37 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (West Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-6063(2)
(West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4002 [24-9-101](a) (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-4351(a) (1977); KY. REV. STAT. § 30A.410(1) (1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-503(1)
(1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2409(A) (West Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2.42.030 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-7(a) (Supp. 1983); WYo. STAT. § 5-1-109(a)
(Supp. 1983).
In addition, three states mandate the appointment of an interpreter in grand jury pro-
ceedings when any witness is deaf: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-201(a) (1973); PA. R. CRIM. P.
209; S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-3-10(1) (1979).
Two states allow the discretionary appointment of interpreters in grand jury proceed-
ings. Ohio permits interpreters "where needed," OHIo R. CRim. P. 6(e). Vermont's similar
rule provides that an interpreter may be present, VT. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
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after arresting deaf suspects. Kiddy v. City of Oklahoma City 38 and State v.
Mason39 highlight several of the problems arising when police officers
arrest deaf suspects. Kiddy upheld the statutory right of deaf suspects in
Oklahoma to an interpreter upon arrest. 40 Mason upheld the right of
deaf suspects to understand Miranda warnings. 41
In Kiddy, the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed the consistent
failure of municipal police officers to provide deaf suspects with inter-
preters for arrest, Miranda warnings, and arraignment.42 Because the
Oklahoma interpreting statute mandates that interpreters be provided
upon arrest,43 the court granted injunctive relief against the police de-
partment on behalf of George Kiddy44 and the Oklahoma Association of
the Deaf and instructed the police agency to comply with the terms of
the statute.45 The court noted that without interpreters, "deaf-mutes,
because of their inability to appreciate all their rights, and communicate
with those able to help them, may be required to remain incarcerated
for a longer period than other individuals not so impaired. '46
In State v. Mason, the Oregon Court of Appeals excluded from trial
38 576 P.2d 298 (Okla. 1978).
39 53 Or. App. 811, 633 P.2d 820 (1981); see also State v. Mason, 56 Or. App. 164,-, 641
P.2d 1139, 1141 (1982) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda need not be excluded
from evidence in a probation revocation hearing).
40 Kiddy, 576 P.2d at 300-01.
41 Mason, 53 Or. App. at 821-22, 633 P.2d at 826-27.
42 The court noted the allegations, verified by affidavit, that "numerous similarly situated
individuals" were denied the benefits of the Oklahoma interpreting statute: "Indeed, the
uncontroverted, verified petition asserts that such deprivation of deaf-mutes' rights amounted
to a continuous course of conduct on the part of the City of Oklahoma City and its agents
and employees .... [W]e must accept the verified allegations as true." Kiddy, 576 P.2d at
301.
43 The Oklahoma statute considered by the court in Kiddy provided:
Every deaf-mute person who is charged with the commission of a criminal offense
shall be entitled to the assistance and services of a qualified interpreter. Prior to ques-
tioning upon arrest and all subsequent proceedings, the court shall procure a qualified
interpreter to assist such persons in communications with officers of the court.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 277, replaced by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 2407-2415 (West
Supp. 1983).
"When a deaf-mute is arrested he shall be entitled to the assistance of an interpreter.
Evidence by the state relating to any statement made by a deaf-mute to a law enforcement
officer shall be limited solely to statements offered, elicited, or made in the presence of a
qualified interpreter." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 278, replaced by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, §§ 2407-2415 (West Supp. 1983).
44 The court noted the denial of Kiddy's constitutional rights: "George Kiddy was left to
languish in jail for two days after arrest and was arraigned without benefit of an interpreter
and without being apprised of: the charges against him, his right to counsel, the right to
remain silent, and the right to be released on bail." Kiddy, 576 P.2d at 301.
45 Id at 300.
46 Id at 301. The court also noted that police officers, consistent with the statute, could
take deaf suspects into physical custody before providing an interpreter; the statute requires
an interpreter only "within a reasonable time after arrest." Id
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statements obtained from a deaf suspect when the police detective failed
to communicate adequately the Miranda warnings to the deaf suspect.4 7
The Oregon interpreting statute48 provides for interpreters upon arrest,
but it does not include a statutory exclusionary rule. Police detectives
repeatedly questioned Dale Mason over a two-week period prior to his
arrest.4 9 The police provided four different interpreters, but none of the
interpreters "was able to communicate adequately in defendant's own
language the concepts contained in Miranda warnings. '50 Concluding
that the defendant did not understand his Miranda warnings,5' the court
excluded incriminating statements from evidence.52
As the Mason case shows, sign language interpretation of the Mi-
randa warnings does not ensure that the warnings will be full and effec-
tive. Deaf suspects will receive varied and inadequate impressions of the
Miranda warnings through sign language interpretation because sign
language varies widely in vocabulary and style.5 3 Moreover, deaf sus-
47 State v. Mason, 53 Or. App. 811, 821, 633 P.2d 820, 826 (1981). Dale Mason was both
deaf and mute.
48 OR. REv. STAT. § 133.515 (1981).
49 53 Or. App. at 813-17, 633 P.2d at 822-24.
50 Id at 821 & n.3, 633 P.2d at 826 & n.3. The second of four interpreters spent 30
minutes with Mason in an interview room at police headquarters attempting to communicate
the Miranda warnings. The police then attempted to have Mason sign the Miranda form but
the interpreter said Mason did not understand his Miranda rights. The detectives allowed the
interpreter to ask defendant directly if he wanted a lawyer, to which Mason responded, "Yes.
Better lawyer, I think. Better lawyer." Id. at 814, 633 P.2d at 822.
At a later interview, police detectives visited Mason at his home and conducted an inter-
rogation without the use of an interpreter by using written transcription.
Later, a third interpreter spent 10 minutes attempting to interpret the Miranda warnings
to Mason before police administered a polygraph test. During the polygraph test, interro-
gators strapped Mason in a chair and "told [him] not to move or to use his hands and that his
answers to questions had to be verbalized." Id at 816, 633 P.2d at 823. This interrogation
prevented Mason from using sign language entirely because his hands were not free.
At the final interview, a fourth interpreter spent no time interpreting the Miranda warn-
ings at all. Mason then made the incriminating statements and the police recorded "the
interpreter's version of what defendant [was] reported to have said." Id. at 817, 633 P.2d at
824.
51 The trial court reasoned that "[t]o give Miranda warnings to this defendant so as to
make an intelligent waiver possible would require an interpreter familiar with and competent
in his primary language. This he did not have." Id. at 822 n.3, 633 P.2d at 827 n.3. Mason
also could have benefited from an R.S.C. interpreter (Reverse Skills Interpreter). See supra
note 12.
52 See Mason, 53 Or. App. at 821, 633 P.2d at 827. The court also determined that police
detectives had detained Mason in custody at the police station at the time he made the incrimi-
nating statements; such detention is a prerequisite for exclusion of the statements under
Oklahoma law. Id. at 821, 633 P.2d at 826.
53 After viewing an experimental film version of the Miranda warnings developed by the
National Association of the Deaf in consultation with linguistic experts, three highly educated
educators of the prelingually deaf gave widely diverse and substandard interpretations of the
warnings:
I. It is about 3 choices you would have when you are arrested by a policeman. 3
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pects may not be able to comprehend the legal meaning of the Miranda
warnings-the "right to remain silent"-through sign language inter-
pretation. 54 Written or printed forms of the Miranda warnings are inef-
fective because many deaf persons are functionally illiterate in the
English language.55
choices are: 1. not to sign anything and keep quiet, 2. make a confession to sign your
name - if you change my mind about my confession, I must refuse to sign my name and
3. get a lawyer and that I should not worry about money to pay for lawyers fee. I can get
them for free.
II. He said, "Suppose you had a police interrogating you" - You have 3 choices. 1.
keep quiet. 2. get a lawyer - can be free of charge if you have no money. 3. If confession
is desired, you can confess some and hold back some information. You have to sign a
form called "CONFESSION FORM" (or whatever).
III. He said: If you get caught by a police you will have three choices. One is - you
don't have to talk, just be silent even if police asking you some questions. Two -you can
get a lawyer for some advice. Third -you may tell or admit all the list you have done,
then you change mind; you have right to change your mind.
Cunningham, The DeafSuspect, BUFFALO POLIcE DEP'T LEGAL BULL., Mar. 16, 1981, at 6-7.
54 Many deaf criminal suspects may have only limited vocabularies in American Sign
Language (A.S.L.). Some may not know the particular sign for the concept of "legal right."
Although finger-spelling may be used for the word "right" in place of a sign, the deaf person
will not understand the meaning of the word unless he or she already understands the concept
of "legal right." In the translations of the experimental film version of the Miranda warnings,
supra note 53, the deaf educators interpreted the "three rights" contained in the warnings as
"three choices."
55 See Mason, 53 Or. App. at 813-14, 821-22 n.3, 633 P.2d at 822-23, 826 n.3.
The standard written form of Miranda warnings is above the sixth grade reading compre-
hension level. Only 10% of the prelingually deaf (those deaf at birth or deaf before the devel-
opment of language skills) can read above the sixth- grade reading level. Thus, 90% of the
prelingually deaf cannot fully comprehend the standard written Miranda warnings. Cunning-
ham, supra note 53, at 3.
More of the deaf can understand another written form of the Miranda warnings, at the
second grade reading level, but it omits the legal content of the warning and the substance of
the constitutional rights protected. While the sixth grade reading level version conveys "the
right to talk to a lawyer," the second grade reading level version merely communicates to deaf
suspects that they can talk to an attorney if they desire. Compare the two versions:
Sixth Grade Version Second Grade Version
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used
against you in Court.
3. You are not being promised anything
to talk to us and no threats are or will
be made against you.
4. You have the right to talk to a lawyer
and have him present now or at any
time during questioning. If you pro-
ceed to answer questions without a
lawyer the questioning will stop if you
should change your mind and request
the presence of a lawyer.
5. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will
be furnished without charge before
any questioning if you so desire.
Cunningham, supra note 53, at 4.
1. You don't have to talk to me.
2. We will use the things you tell me in
Court. We will use them to decide if
you did something wrong or not.
3. We will not give you anything for
talking. We will not do anything to
you if you don't talk.
4. You can talk to a lawyer if you want.
You can have a lawyer here while you
talk. If you start to talk and then
decide you want a lawyer, we will get
one.
5. If you don't have the money for a
lawyer, we will get one for you. We
can get the lawyer before you start
talking.
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Recognizing the inadequacies of the interpreted version or the
printed form of the Miranda warnings, some interpreters simply instruct
deaf suspects to wait for an attorney or question deaf suspects directly to
determine whether they want an attorney.56 While this method may
protect deaf suspects from an illegal interrogation, it does not ensure
that deaf suspects will be apprised of their right to remain silent, as the
United States Supreme Court envisioned in Miranda .57
Miranda warnings cannot be full and effective for most deaf crimi-
nal suspects unless the warnings are interpreted adequately through sign
language. In Mason, the Oregon court used an exclusionary rule to
guarantee adequate Miranda warnings to deaf suspects through sign lan-
guage interpretation.5 8 Although a few states provide interpreters upon
arrest,59 and others mandate an exclusionary rule for non-interpreted
interrogations, 60 deaf suspects' right to be informed of the Miranda warn-
ings fully and effectively must be protected in all states.6 The legal
system can guarantee a translation, but deaf educators, interpreters, lin-
guists, and the legal system must work together to provide deaf criminal
suspects with a full and effective understanding of the Miranda warnings.
B. PROTECTING DEAF SUSPECTS' RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
After police arrest deaf criminal suspects and adequately inform
them of the Miranda rights, deaf suspects may exercise those constitu-
tional rights by requesting an attorney. The right to an attorney guar-
anteed by the sixth amendment means the right to effective assistance of
counsel. 62 To represent a deaf suspect effectively, the appointed attor-
ney must establish and maintain communication with the client. To do
56 See supra note 50.
57 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
In Chicago in early 1982, city policemen learned a hard lesson about the nature of the
deaf. Two policemen observed several teenagers on a street corner signing with each other in
sign language, using bold and articulated gestures which the policemen assumed were ob-
scene. As the police started to approach the boys to investigate, the boys ran away. The
policemen suspected trouble from the fleeing boys, chased them, accosted them, and struck
two of them. The officers arrested the group for disorderly conduct. Later, the police learned
from parents that the boys were deaf and that the "obscene" gestures were the boys' means of
communicating. The arresting officers had assumed the boys were simply members of a street
gang. One parent responded, "The only gang [they're] part of is a deaf-mute crowd ...
What makes me so mad is that they didn't even have the sense to bring in an interpreter so
the boys could explain themselves." Royko, Deaf Ear of the Law, Chi. Sun-Times, April 4,
1982, at 2.
58 53 Or. App. at 821, 633 P.2d at 826.
59 See supra note 34.
60 See supra note 36.
61 See infra MODEL INT-'ERPRETING STATUTE § 4(a).
62 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470-73; see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964).
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so, the attorney must use an interpreter for conferences with the deaf
client at all stages of the criminal process. Four states presently provide
sign language interpretation for conferences between deaf suspects and
their attorneys, 63 at least at some stages of the criminal process.
Courts have not considered whether a sign language interpreter is
necessary to ensure the effective assistance of counsel for deaf suspects.
In cases involving foreign-language-speaking criminal suspects, courts
have differed as to whether criminal suspects have the right to inter-
preted conferences with their attorneys at various stages of the criminal
process. The courts all recognized, however, that judges must consider
the existence of communication between the suspect and the attorney in
evaluating whether the suspect's right to the assistance of counsel was
protected.
In Parra v. Page,64 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals set
aside the defendant's conviction in the lower court where the Spanish-
speaking defendant appeared at arraignment and pleaded guilty with-
out the benefit of a Spanish interpreter.6 5 Although the court appointed
an attorney on the day of the arraignment, the attorney was not able to
communicate with Parra to formulate a defense or even to discover the
facts. In setting aside the conviction, the court concluded that Parra did
not understand the proceeding and had no effective assistance of
counsel.66
In United States ex rel. Navarro v. Johnson ,67 involving a Spanish-speak-
ing defendant, the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania ordered an evidentiary hearing to consider "whether or not the
possible breakdown in communication between petitioner and his coun-
sel. . . affected petitioner's constitutional rights to effective counsel, due
process, and/or confrontation." '6 8 The district court expressed concern
about "whether petitioner could comment to his lawyer about the wit-
nesses' testimony, point out inconsistencies with the facts if they oc-
63 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(A) (West Supp. 1983) (possibly restricting interpreted
sessions to conferences in court or immediately prior to trial because the language of the
statute provides for an interpreter "to interpret preparations with the deaf person's attor-
ney"); Ky. REv. STAT. § 30A.425 (1980) (broadly defining the duties of the interpreter to
include interpreting "any and all meetings and conferences between client and his attorney"
during court and court-related proceedings); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2409(A) (West
Supp. 1983) (requiring the court to appoint a qualified interpreter "to assist in preparation
with counsel"); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.31(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982) (providing
an interpreter for communications between the deaf suspect and counsel).
64 430 P.2d 834 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967). Parra was a habeas corpus proceeding involving a
Spanish-speaking suspect.
65 Id. at 836, 838.
66 Id. at 837.
67 365 F. Supp. 676 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
68 Id at 681.
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curred and make suggestions as to questions to be asked." 6 9 Without
ruling on the constitutional issue of the suspect's right to effective assist-
ance of counsel, 70 the district court reviewed the rights of non-English-
speaking criminal defendants in a two-page footnote to the case, 71 inter
alia, to underscore the constitutional importance of the ability of the
accused "to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding. '72
In Cervantes v. Cox, 73 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that "[t]he existence of a language barrier between counsel and
client is merely one circumstance probing the questions of whether the
accused has been adequately represented by counsel and has voluntarily
and knowingly entered his plea."'74 Although Cervantes claimed a lan-
guage barrier, the court found that he had a sufficient knowledge of
English "to be completely aware of all the proceedings. '75
Parra supports aper se right of deaf suspects to have a sign language
interpreter present to enable suspects to understand and communicate
with counsel. 76 While not finding an absolute right to interpreted con-
ferences between attorney and client, Navarro and Cervantes note that in-
adequate communication between criminal suspects and their attorneys
may deny the suspects their right to assistance of counsel.7 7 Deaf sus-
pects thus do not have aper se right to an interpreter under the guaran-
tee of effective assistance of counsel. They must have an interpreter,78
69 Id at 683.
70 The district court held that the issue of effective assistance of counsel was moot because
the defendant made no complaint about his inability to confer with his attorney. Id.
71 Id at 681-83 n.3. The district court spoke approvingly of a proposed congressional bill
to establish a bilingual court system in federal jurisdictions with large non-English-speaking
populations.
72 Id at 682 n.3 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1962) (per curiam); also
citing United States ex ret. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970)).
73 350 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1965). Cervantes, a Spanish-speaking defendant who also
spoke some English, brought a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the constitutionality of his
state conviction. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the conviction, ruling
that Cervantes had no constitutional right to an interpreter to help facilitate the right to
assistance of counsel. Id. at 855.
74 Id
75 Id at 855-56.
76 Parra, 430 P.2d at 837.
77 Cervantes, 350 F.2d at 855-56; Navarro, 365 F. Supp. at 683.
78 Interpreting at attorney-client conferences during trial raises several issues. If the guar-
antee of effective assistance of counsel means that the deaf suspect should be provided with an
interpreter for conferences with the attorney during trial, then two interpreters may be re-
quired: one to interpret the testimony and one to interpret conferences with the attorney.
Alternatively, the trial judge could order breaks in the course of the trial for such conferences.
The Navarro court's analysis of the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial also
should apply to pre-trial conferences between the suspect and the attorney because the well-
prepared attorney always should be aware of the client's version of the facts. Furthermore, an
attorney may help protect the suspect's rights at interrogation.
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however, when they show a failure to understand communications with
counsel.
79
When the criminal justice system makes interpreters available for
conferences between deaf suspects and attorneys, courts will have to face
the question of the confidentiality of the interpreted conference. Al-
though all criminal suspects are entitled to the benefits of the attorney-
client privilege,8 0 it is unclear whether deaf criminal suspects enjoy the
attorney-client privilege for conversations when an interpreter is pres-
ent. Deaf suspects will not give their attorneys a full and honest disclo-
sure without an attorney-client privilege that also guarantees the
confidentiality of the interpreter. Fourteen states protect by statute the
confidentiality of interpreted conversations that would be privileged if
the interpreter were not present. 8 1 Although the courts have never ruled
79 Deaf criminal suspects may face a difficult burden in showing their failure to under-
stand. Some courts have held that deaf suspects may "understand" the proceedings through
written transcription.
In Turner v. State, 429 So. 2d 645 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982), an Alabama court affirmed
the conviction of a deaf-mute defendant who appeared at an arraignment without an inter-
preter. The deaf defendant communicated with the judge entirely by written transcription
and nodding his head. Citing Todd v. State, 380 So. 2d 370 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), for the
proposition that a deaf-mute may testify at trial through written questions and answers, the
Turner court extended the holding in Todd to allow a deaf defendant to be apprised of the
proceedings at arraignment through written transcription. Turner, 429 So.2d at 647. The
court reasoned: "All the law contemplates is that the accused know and understand the na-
ture of the accusation he is called upon to answer." Id. The court noted that where the
suspect fails to request an interpreter under the state interpreting statute (ALA. CODE § 12-21-
131 to 12-21-134 (1975) (enacted 1965)), how the constitutional requirement that the suspect
understand the accusation is satisfied is immaterial, "so long as it is actually satisfied." Id.
It is common for a deaf person, or anyone conversing in an unfamiliar language, to nod
his or her head in agreement without fully understanding the nature of the assent. Thus,
interpreters and lawyers should ascertain a "yes" or "no" answer rather than a nodding of the
head.
Although written transcription is inadequate for the purposes of a lengthy criminal trial,
see supra note 11, it may serve to inform a particular deaf suspect of the proceedings. The
Turner court correctly stressed that the suspect actually must understand the proceedings.
Turner errs, however, in placing the burden on the suspect to request an interpreter or, by
failing to request one, to waive the right. See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE §§ 3(b), 5
for a solution to the waiver problem.
80 Under the attorney-client privilege, all communications made to an attorney by the
client seeking legal advice are permanently protected from disclosure by the client and the
attorney unless the privilege is waived. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961).
81 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(E) (West Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.6063(7)
(West Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622B-6 (West Supp. 1982); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 30A.430 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.33(4) (West Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 50.053 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 521-A:11 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-9-10
(Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-5 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28.33-06 (Supp. 1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2414 (West Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(0 (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 19.2-164.1 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.015 (West Supp. 1983).
The Kentucky interpreting statute's section on privilege is one of the most well-written:
Every person who acts as an interpreter in circumstances involving the arrest, police
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on this issue,82 the confidentiality of interpreted conversations should be
protected, and states without such protections should enact statutes pro-
viding for interpreter confidentiality. 8 3
The assistance of counsel cannot be effective for deaf suspects unless
suspects have an opportunity to confer with their attorneys through a
sign language interpreter. A few states provide for interpreted confer-
ences between deaf suspects and attorneys,8 4 but the right to effective
assistance of counsel must be protected by statute in all states.8 5 Fur-
thermore, attorneys must be informed of the special problems con-
fronting deaf suspects in the criminal justice system. 86
C. PROTECTING DEAF SUSPECTS' RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AT
TRIAL
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
to all criminal suspects the right to confront the witnesses testifying
against them. 7 Hearing suspects can exercise this constitutional right
when prosecutors present witnesses in open court with the suspect pres-
ent. In contrast, deaf defendants cannot exercise their right of confron-
tation without a sign language interpreter to help them understand the
testimony of the witnesses.
The right of confrontation guaranteed in the sixth amendment pro-
tects the right of criminal suspects to be physically and mentally present
when the prosecution presents adverse testimony. 88 In Ohio v. Roberts,89
custody or other stage in a criminal, civil, or other matter of a [deaf] person ... shall not
be examined as a witness regarding conversations between that person and his attorney,
when such conversations would otherwise be subject to the attorney-client privilege,
without the consent of that person.
KY. REv. STAT. § 30A.430 (1980).
The interpreter does not have aper se privilege not to reveal interpreted conversations.
He should have the privilege, however, not to reveal pvileged conversations.
82 In Public Defender for Anne Arundel County v. State's Attorney for Anne Arundel
County, 281 Md. 702, 381 A.2d 1153 (1978), the prosecutor summoned an interpreter before
the grand jury to testify about a conversation between a deaf suspect and his attorney when
the interpreter and two other persons were also present. Because the grand jury indicted the
suspect without the interpreter's testimony, the court ruled the issue of interpreter confidenti-
ality moot. Id. at 703, 381 A.2d at 1154.
83 See inf a MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 9.
84 See supra note 63.
85 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 4(d).
86 ,See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 13(0. Law schools should develop courses
dealing with the rights of the handicapped.
87 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, supra note 1. The Supreme Court imposed the sixth amend-
ment obligations on the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965), in which Justice
Black wrote: "There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have
been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation
and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial
which is this country's constitutional goal." Id. at 405.
88 Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
COMMENTS
the United States Supreme Court observed that "the [Confrontation]
Clause envisions 'a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an opportunity. . . of testing the rec-
ollection and sifting the conscience of the witness.' "90 One state
supreme court has ruled that "[t]he purpose of the confrontation must
be to permit the defendant to be advised of the proceedings against
him."9 1
To protect suspects' constitutional right of confrontation, courts
have provided the right to interpreters in cases involving foreign-lan-
guage-speaking suspects where interpreters would aid the suspect's un-
derstanding. In Garcia v. State,92 a Texas court ruled that the lower court
abused its discretion by denying the Spanish-speaking defendant an in-
terpreter because "[u]nless appellant was in some manner, either
through his counsel or an interpreter, afforded knowledge of the testi-
mony of the witness, the right of cross-examination could not be exer-
cised by him."19 3 Likewise, in United States ex reL Negron v. New York, 94 the
Second Circuit noted that it is "imperative that every criminal defend-
ant-if the right to be present is to have meaning-possesses 'sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding.' ,,95 Like these foreign-language-speaking de-
fendants, deaf defendants can be guaranteed their constitutional right to
confront the witnesses only when they understand the testimony. The
89 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
90 Id. at 63-64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895)).
91 State v. Vasquez, 101 Utah 444, 450, 121 P.2d 903, 905 (1942).
92 151 Tex. Crim. 593, 210 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948).
93 Id. at 601, 210 S.W.2d at 580. The court also noted that "[t]he constitutional right of
confrontation means something more than merely bringing the accused and the witness face
to face; it embodies and carries with it the valuable right of cross-examination of the wit-
ness," Id.
94 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970). In Negron, the court affirmed the relief granted in a habeas
corpus proceeding, ruling that Negron's trial lacked the basic fairness required by the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although the trial judge provided an inter-
preter to translate the testimony of two Spanish-speaking witnesses for the benefit of the court
and the jury, Negron had no interpreter to translate the testimony of the English-speaking
witnesses.
95 Id at 390 (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1962) (per curiam)). Judge
Kaufman, writing for the Second Circuit in Negron, also commented:
ITihe right that was denied Negron seems to us even more consequential than the right
of confrontation. Considerations of fairness, the integrity of the fact-finding process, and
the potency of our adversary system of justice forbid that the state should prosecute a
defendant who is not present at his own trial, unless by his conduct he waives that
right. ...
Not only for the sake of effective cross-examination, however, but as a matter of
simple humaneness, Negron deserved more than to sit in total incomprehension as the
trial proceeded. Particularly inappropriate in this nation where many languages are
spoken is a callousness to the crippling language handicap of a newcomer to its shores,
whose life and freedom the state by its criminal processes chooses to put in jeopardy.
Id at 389-90 (citations omitted).
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criminal justice system must protect deaf defendants' right to under-
stand the testimony by providing a sign language interpreter.
Presently, thirty-nine states provide by statute for the mandatory
appointment of an interpreter at the criminal trial of a deaf defendant.
9 6
Under most of the mandatory interpreting statutes, the court must ap-
point an interpreter unless the deaf defendant can adequately under-
stand the proceedings without a sign language interpreter.9 7 Another
five states permit the court to appoint an interpreter at the judge's dis-
cretion.98 These forty-four statutes contain varied procedural and sub-
stantive provisions that affect deaf suspects' constitutional rights. 99 The
other six states provide little or no statutory protection at all for deaf
suspects.
The states that adopted mandatory interpreting statutes showed lit-
tle faith in judicial discretion in the sua sponte appointment of interpret-
ers. 100 In states without mandatory interpreting statutes, a trial court's
failure to appoint an interpreter will cause reversal of the defendant's
conviction only if the trial judge abused the discretion. In United States v.
Desist,10 1 involving a foreign-language-speaking defendant, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that there was no abuse of discre-
tion. The trial judge could refuse to appoint an interpreter where the
defendant had sufficient financial means to compensate an interpreter
and had access to bilingual attorneys.10 2 The court noted that "the real
point is guarantee of a fair trial."' 10 3
Other courts have limited the reach of the state interpreting stat-
utes on both procedural and substantive grounds. Courts may ignore
the statutes if the failure to appoint an interpreter resulted in no
prejudice,10 4 if the suspect's lack of understanding was not caused by
96 See supra note 23.
97 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. § 30A-410(1)(a) (1980) (interpreter should be appointed when
person has "difficulty in readily understanding or communicating" spoken words).
98 See supra note 23.
99 See infra text accompanying notes 142-68.
100 In Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), the court noted that the
mandatory state interpreting statute enacted in 1961 effectively overturned Field v. State, 155
Tex. Crim. 137, 232 S.W.2d 717 (1950) which had allowed the deaf defendant to waive an
interpreter by failing to request one. Baltierra, 586 S.W.2d at 557. Judge Davis disagreed in
dissent, arguing instead that the "abuse of discretion test" should still apply, even against
mandatory statutes. Id. at 559-60 (Davis, J., dissenting). The court in Ballienra directed trial
judges to appoint interpreters, under the mandate of the statute, "when it is made known to
the trial court that an accused does not speak and understand the English language." Id. at
559.
101 384 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1967).
102 Id at 902.
103 Id
104 Chatoff v. Public Service Commission of New York, 60 A.D.2d 700, 400 N.Y.S.2d 390
(1977). In Chatof, a case involving a deaf civil plaintiff, the court held that the absence of a
1984]
COMMENTS
the court's failure to appoint an interpreter, 10 5 or if the suspect failed to
request an interpreter within a reasonable time before trial. 0 6 Courts
are more likely to find reasons not to apply even the mandatory statutes
if they are convinced of the defendant's guilt.10 7
The only constitutionally acceptable standard of review is whether
the deaf suspect was able to understand the proceedings without a sign
language interpreter; this is precisely the standard envisioned in the
mandatory interpreting statutes.108 The "abuse of discretion" standard
or "fairness" test employed by some courts is not appropriate because
the courts remain free to overlook a suspect's lack of understanding and
consequent denial of constitutional rights. While the absence of
prejudice to a civil party provides support for upholding trial court deci-
sions, 10 9 criminal suspects deserve to have such denials reviewed under a
stricter standard. As the framers of the Constitution recognized in the
sixth amendment, 1 0 prejudice is likely to result when a deaf defendant
cannot confront adverse witnesses and cannot report possible inaccura-
cies in testimony. Trial courts should not deny deaf defendants the right
to understand the testimony through sign language interpretation
merely because the deaf defendant failed to request an interpreter. 11
The burden of coming forward with evidence of an inability to under-
stand spoken language should be on the deaf defendant only where such
inability is not obvious to the trial court.
D. PROTECTING DEAF SUSPECTS INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL
Courts determining whether to provide an interpreter focus on the
nature of the deaf suspect's understanding of the criminal process. In
sign language interpreter at plaintiff's hearing "did not prejudice [his] case and does not,
therefore, warrant a reversal." Id. at 700, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
105 People v. Guillory, 178 Cal. App. 2d 854, 3 Cal. Rptr. 415, aJ'd sub nom. Guillory v.
Wilson, 402 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1968). In Guilloy, involving a deaf suspect's malfunctioning
hearing aid, the court put the burden on the deaf defendant to bring batteries or request the
court to change seating arrangements at trial to enable the defendant to better understand
the testimony. Reluctant to require the trial judge to make any special effort, the court held:
"No objection was made to proceeding further or effort made to change the seating arrange-
ments. . . . It is quite apparent that any difficulty defendant may have had in following the
proceedings was self-induced." Id at 859, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
106 Field v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 137, 232 S.W.2d 717 (1950). On rehearing, the court in
Field made clear that the deaf-mute defendant could waive the constitutional right to con-
front the witnesses by the failure to request the services of an interpreter within a reasonable
time. Id at 140, 232 S.W.2d at 718.
107 In Field, the court heard direct testimony by a witness, the victim, that the defendant
shot at her. Id. at 138, 232 S.W.2d at 718; see also infra note 167.
108 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 3(b); see also supra note 23.
109 See supra note 104.
110 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, supra note 1.
I II See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 3(a)-(b).
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most cases, a sign language interpreter can aid deaf suspects to reach a
full understanding of the proceedings. In some cases, however, deaf sus-
pects are completely unable to communicate even with the aid of a sign
language interpreter. Because the Constitution guarantees to the de-
fendant in criminal prosecutions the rights to "be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation" and to the "assistance of counsel,"'1 2 deaf
suspects unable to communicate may not stand trial.113
Although incompetent suspects are incapable of standing trial, they
also may not be committed to mental institutions "simply on account of
[their] incompetency to stand trial on the charges .... -114 In Jackson v.
Indiana,'15 the United States Supreme Court held that defendants found
unfit to stand trial must be either civilly committed or released.' t6 A
combination of temporary civil commitment 1 7 and sign language train-
ing equitably protects suspects' constitutional right not to stand trial
while giving suspects sign language training so that they may someday
stand trial. Furthermore, temporary commitment protects the public
interest in helping to keep streets free of suspected lawbreakers.
In effect, the Illinois courts achieved this result in the case of Don-
ald Lang. Lang, who had no communication skills and no knowledge of
112 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, supra note 1.
113 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (test of competency to
stand trial is "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him").
In United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1976), involving a mentally ill
defendant, Judge Bazelon ruled: "It is 'fundamental to an adversary system ofjustice' that an
individual whose 'mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the na-
ture and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in pre-
paring his defense' may not be subjected to a trial." Id. at 725 (citations omitted).
William Blackstone recognized in the eighteenth century that "if it is found at the trial of
the prisoner that he cannot understand the proceedings, the judge ought to discharge the jury
and put an end to the trial, or order a verdict of not guilty." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 24 (9th ed. 1873); see Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81
HARV. L. REv. 454, 458 (1967).
Many courts never considered the issue of a deaf defendant's capacity to stand trial
because some states traditionally did not hold the deaf criminally responsible for their behav-
ior. This practice changed along with enlightened social attitudes toward the deaf. P. HIG-
GINS, supra note 5, at 25-26.
114 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 720 (1972).
115 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
116 Id. at 738. InJackson, the Court ruled that the state may not subject a mentally re-
tarded deaf defendant to permanent civil commitment on the basis of an unproved criminal
charge that is forever unprovable because the deaf criminal suspect is constitutionally pre-
vented from standing trial. Id.
117 In most states, civil commitment must be based on a judicial finding that a person (1) is
mentally ill and reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another,
or (2) is mentally ill and unable to provide for his basic physical needs. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § 1-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
COMMENTS [Vol. 75
sign language, was arrested in 1965 for one murder and charged in 1971
with another.' 1 8 After the original 1965 charge, Lang's lawyer agreed to
waive Lang's constitutional protections against his standing trial, realiz-
ing that Lang faced indefinite commitment otherwise." 9 The court,
however, denied Lang's request for trial and civilly committed him.'
20
Lang's lawyer filed a petition in habeas corpus, contending that Lang was
serving a sentence for life when he had never been convicted of a crime.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that Lang deserved a trial to determine
whether the state had enough evidence to convict Lang or whether he
should be released. 12 1 At this trial, five years after the 1965 murder, the
state dropped the charges and released Lang because the principal wit-
ness had died.12 2
After the second charge of murder, Lang's lawyer again waived
Lang's constitutional right not to stand trial, 2 3 and the trial court, tak-
ing special precautions to guarantee a fair trial, sentenced Lang to four-
teen to twenty-five years imprisonment after the jury found Lang
guilty.' 24 The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the conviction, 25 find-
ing that "no trial procedures could effectively compensate for the handi-
cap of a deaf mute with whom there could be no communication."'
126
That court remanded the case for a hearing on Lang's fitness to stand
trial.' 27 In 1979, after procedural delays, both Lang's public defender
and conservator appealed his case to the Illinois Supreme Court.128
The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that deaf criminal sus-
118 People v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d 311, 316-22, 391 N.E.2d 350, 351-54 (1979). After eighteen
years of litigation in the Illinois courts, Donald Lang's case still is unresolved.
119 Id at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351. Jackson, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), which established the due
process and equal protection rights of deaf criminal suspects, had not yet been decided.
120 People v. Lang, 37 Ill. 2d 75, 81, 224 N.E.2d 838, 841 (1967); see supra note 116. The
Superintendent of the State Department of Mental Health certified that it was unlikely that
Lang would ever be able to stand trial because he performed poorly in sign language training.
Lang, 76 Ill. 2d at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351.
121 People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281, 288, 263 N.E.2d 109, 113 (1970).
122 Lang, 76 Ill. 2d at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351.
123 Id. at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351.
124 Id at 318, 391 N.E.2d at 352.
125 People v. Lang, 26 Ill. App. 3d 648, 658, 325 N.E.2d 305, 311 (1975).
126 Lang, 76 Ill. 2d at 318, 391 N.E.2d at 352.
127 At this hearing, the trial judge ordered Lang released on bail, under section 5-2-2(a) of
the Unified Code of Corrections (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(a)(repealed by P.A. 81-
1217, § 3, effective Dec. 28, 1979; replaced by ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 104-10 to 104-29
(Smith-Hurd 1980))). The court directed the Department of Mental Health and Develop-
mental Disabilities to develop an appropriate language training program. In October 1977,
however, the trial court allowed the Department to discharge Lang to the Cook County jail,
at the same time issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Department to create a treatment
program. The appellate court reversed the mandamus order and denied a separate petition for
haheas corpus filed on Lang's behalf. Lang, 62 Ill. App. 3d 688, 378 N.E.2d 1106 (1978).
128 Lang, 76 Ill. 2d at 311, 391 N.E.2d at 350.
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pects ruled unfit to stand trial present special problems for the criminal
justice system. 129 A finding of unfitness could result in permanent com-
mitment to a mental institution, which creates "long periods of confine-
ment for criminal defendants who, had they been fit, might have plea
bargained to a relatively light sentence, obtained an outright or insanity
acquittal, or received a prison sentence subject to both maximum limits
and parole."' 30 The result is inequitable to deaf criminal suspects.
Other defendants who are unfit to stand trial because they are mentally
incompetent are legitimately subject to involuntary civil commitment.
Deaf suspects like Lang, however, become subject to commitment be-
cause of an alleged crime for which they cannot stand trial and for
which the criminal justice system presents no other solution.
Donald Lang arguably was not subject to involuntary commitment
under the Illinois statute because he was not mentally ill.' 3 1 Release of
Lang, on the other hand, was not a feasible political step for the
court. 132 The Illinois Supreme Court held that Lang should be "consid-
ered" mentally ill for the purposes of civil commitment:
Hereafter, if a person is found unfit to stand trial, he should be considered
to be mentally ill under the [Mental Health and Development Disabilities]
Code unless his unfitness is due to a solely physical condition. If that per-
son also meets the dangerousness requirement of the Code, he should be
considered to be a "person subject to involuntary admission."' 133
Remanding the case for a hearing on Lang's dangerousness, 3 4 the court
indicated its intention to keep Lang in custody where he could attempt
to learn sign language. Although it is unlikely Lang will ever be fit to
stand trial, 135 he is being given care and training in sign language.
The crux of the Illinois decision, however, is that deaf defendants
with little cultural contact (those who lacked the opportunities to de-
velop communication skills) may be subject to civil commitment based
entirely on circumstantial evidence of dangerousness. 136 In effect, the
129 Id. at 324, 391 N.E.2d at 355.
130 Id at 323, 391 N.E.2d at 354.
131 Id at 324, 391 N.E.2d at 355.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 356. The statute cited is ILL- ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, §§ 1-110
to 6-107 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983).
134 On rehearing, the trial court civilly committed Lang to the Illinois Department of
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. Telephone interview with Donald Paull,
Lang's Public Defender, in Chicago (Sept. 1983).
135 Lang will probably never learn enough sign language to be able to stand trial, but he
has learned simple concepts in sign language. He understands the concept of "death," but
probably does not understand the concept of "murder." Lang has a mild character disorder
that is not mentally based. His condition is diagnosed as suerto-phrenia, a medical term that
is used to describe only deaf persons such as Lang who have been culturally deprived. Id.
136 Id Without sworn testimony in a court oflaw, the charges against any criminal suspect
remain unproved and thus circumstantial.
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Illinois court defines deafness, where the deaf person has no communica-
tion skills, as a mental illness.
The Louisiana Supreme Court followed the Lang precedent in State
v. Williams,' 37 ruling over strong dissent 138 that deaf suspects found unfit
to stand trial may be subject to involuntary civil commitment when the
trial court finds them to be dangerous.' 39 The court highlighted proce-
dural safeguards that protect civilly committed persons from wrongful
commitment: judicial review after 180 days, administrative review by
the director of mental health, and federal habeas corpus.' 40 These proce-
dural reviews are not adequate because they do not resolve the question
of the deaf defendant's guilt or innocence; thus, under this reasoning,
deaf suspects may continue to be subject to permanent commitment on
the basis of circumstantial evidence of guilt.
Legislatures should enact statutes mandating temporary custodial
care and training in sign language for deaf defendants incapable of
standing trial.' 4' Alternatively, the courts could release deaf defendants
in custodial care or on probation while providing sign language training
through a state agency. Deaf suspects incapable of standing trial must
be afforded an opportunity as early as possible to obtain a trial on the
unproven criminal charge.
II. IMPLEMENTING THE RIGHT OF DEAF SUSPECTS TO UNDERSTAND
THE PROCEEDINGS
Deaf criminal suspects' right to an interpreter at all stages of the
criminal process is meaningless without effective machinery in state and
federal criminal justice systems to implement the right. Many states 42
and the federal government 4 3 have enacted legislation to implement
and protect deaf suspects' right to an interpreter. Although most legisla-
137 392 So. 2d 641 (La. 1980).
138 "The majority now strains a new definition of'mentally ill' from the defendant's inabil-
ity to communicate because of his speech and hearing impairment." Id at 645 (Dixon, J.,
dissenting). Judge Dixon suggested "interdiction," or custodial care, for the deaf defendant
who is ruled unfit to stand trial. Id. at 645-46.
139 "If a person is found unfit to stand trial because of an inability to effectively communi-
cate, he should be considered 'mentally ill' under La.R.S. 28:54 unless his unfitness is due
solely to a physical condition." Id. at 643-44. If his unfitness is solely physical, the court can
civilly commit the deaf person if it finds the person dangerous. Id at 644.
140 Id at 644; see also State v. Hunt, 47 Ohio St. 2d 170, 351 N.E.2d 106 (1976) (two-year
limited term of civil commitment of a deaf-mute is constitutionally permissible under the
Jackson standard).
141 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 12.
142 See supra note 23.
143 In 1978, Congress approved the Bilingual Hearing and Speech Impaired Court Re-
porter Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827 (Supp. 1983), which mandates appointment of a qualified inter-
preter in any civil or criminal action initiated by the United States with a deaf participant.
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tures have expressed some intent to aid deaf criminal suspects' right to
understand'legal proceedings, 44 substantive and procedural limitations
prevent all of the implementing statutes from adequately serving this
goal.
The procedural concerns in providing an interpreter are many.
First, court or criminal justice personnel must determine whether an in-
terpreter is needed and then must locate an interpreter. After this, the
court must ensure that proper communication takes place. Finally, the
interpreter must be compensated.
Many of the state interpreting statutes do not indicate how a court
should determine whether an interpreter is needed. Some states require
that the deaf suspect request the services of an interpreter between two
days and thirty days prior to the proceedings. ' 45 Several states allow the
court to require that the deaf participant furnish reasonable proof of
deafness. 46 Only seven states allow the deaf defendant to request a Re-
144 Four states declared their legislative purposes in the body of the state interpreting stat-
utes. Washington's 1973 Act states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state to secure the constitutional rights
of deaf persons and of other persons who, because of impairment of hearing or speech,
are unable to readily understand or communicate spoken language, and who conse-
quently cannot be fully protected in legal proceedings unless qualified interpreters are
available to assist them.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.42.010 (Supp. 1983). The Montana and Nebraska statutory
purpose sections mirror that of Washington's. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-501 (1983); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 25-2401 (1981).
Minnesota has declared: "It is. . . the policy of this state that the constitutional rights
of persons handicapped in communication cannot be fully protected unless qualified inter-
preters are available to assist them in legal proceedings." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.30 (West
Supp. 1984).
Arkansas includes the legislative history of the interpreting law in the 1981 statutory
compilation:
WHEREAS, there are approximately 30,000 deaf citizens residing in the State of
Arkansas; and WHEREAS, there is no provision in the laws of this State providing for
an impartial and verbatim translation of court proceedings wherein deaf persons are
either parties thereto or called as witnesses therein; and WHEREAS, this Act is necessary
in order to insure the integrity of our judicial process in the eyes and minds of our deaf
citizens ....
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-148 to 153 (Supp. 1983) (Legislative History).
145 ALA. CODE § 12-21-133 (1975) (requiring 30 days); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.6063(4)
(West Supp. 1983) (requiring five days); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4002 [24-9-102](a) (Supp.
1982) (requiring five days); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622B-3 (West Supp. 1982) (requiring request
within three days after receiving notice of hearing, or if the notice is received within less than
five days before the hearing, "as soon as practicable"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-9-6 (Supp.
1983) (requiring two weeks); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2412 (West Supp. 1983) (requiring
48 hours).
North Carolina and Texas simply require that the deaf person notify the court "prior to
appearance." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-4 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(c) (Supp. 1983).
146 GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4002 [24-9-102] (b) (Supp. 1982) (court may request proof of
disability); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48(2)(C) (1979) (court may require proof of deaf-
ness); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-9-6 (Supp. 1983) (may require reasonable proof of deafness);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-4 (1981) (court may require proof of deafness); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-
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verse Skills Certified (R.S.C.) interpreter14 7 or an aural-oral inter-
preter. 48 A few states permit deaf persons to waive the right to an
interpreter, although in several of these states deaf persons may waive
their rights only with the approval of their attorney or the court.
49
Statutes that require deaf suspects to request an interpreter do not
adequately protect the deaf suspects' rights. Given their handicap, deaf
suspects often are poor advocates for their own constitutional rights.
Deaf suspects may be unaware of the protection the state interpreting
law affords or unable to acquire such protection. Deaf suspects may not
33-03 (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2412 (West Supp. 1983) (court may require
"reasonable proof of deafness"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(d) (Supp. 1983) (court may
require deaf person to provide "reasonable proof of his deafness"). The statutes do not define
the reasonable proof needed. These statutes may thus allow too much judicial discretion in
the decision whether an interpreter is necessary.
147 Four states allow the deaf defendant to request an R.S.C. (Reverse Skills Certified)
interpreter to supplement the originally appointed interpreter. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
242() (West Supp. 1983); CAL. EVID. CODE § 754(d) (West Supp. 1984); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 30A.410(2) (1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-505 (1983) (deaf person may request an "in-
termediary interpreter"); see supra note 12.
Although the Nevada statute does not specifically allow the deaf defendant to request an
R.S.C. interpreter, it authorizes the deaf participant to request a replacement for the ap-
pointed interpreter and gives the deaf person a choice of interpreters "whenever possible."
NEv. REV. STAT. § 50.052 (1979).
In Arizona, if the only available interpreter "does not possess adequate interpreting skills
for the particular situation, the court . . .may permit the deaf person to nominate another
person [such as an R.S.C. interpreter or a family member] to act as an intermediary inter-
preter between the deaf person and the appointed interpreter during proceedings." ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(F) (West Supp. 1983).
148 Three states allow the deaf person to request an aural-oral interpreter. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8B-1(3) (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2410(B) (West Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 24-1-103(a)(3) (Supp. 1983). The deaf person who can speak and relies on speech-
reading rather than sign language can use an aural-oral interpreter who exaggerates the lip
and facial movements of speech so that the deaf person can easily and effectively decipher the
words spoken and then respond verbally. The use of aural-oral interpreting is rare because it
requires a very well-trained deaf speechreader.
149 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(G) (West Supp. 1983) (deaf person may waive the
right or provide one's own interpreter); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622B.2 (West Supp. 1982) (court
shall appoint an interpreter unless the deaf person waives this right); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-
1-16 (Supp. 1983) (court shall appoint interpreter unless right is waived); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 49-4-510 (1983) (deaf person may waive right to interpreter); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-9-4
(Supp. 1983) (deaf person may "at any point in any proceeding waive the right to the services
of an interpreter"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-3(b) (1981) (deaf person may provide an inter-
preter at his or her own expense); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2410(B) (West Supp. 1983) (the
right to an interpreter can be waived only by a non-signing deaf person in writing and with
the approval of the person's attorney and the judge); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(a)(3)
(Supp. 1983) (right to an interpreter may not be waived except in writing, subject to the
approval of the deaf person's attorney and the judge); VA. CODE § 19.2-164.1 (1983) (deaf
person may waive the right with the approval of counsel). Requiring the approval of counsel
for waiving an interpreter is not much protection for the deaf suspect because most attorneys
have no experience with interpreters or deaf suspects. This is one argument for public aware-
ness programs about the deaf. Law schools in particular are well-situated to sponsor such
programs.
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be able to request an interpreter orally. Without paper and pencil, deaf
suspects cannot request an interpreter even in writing. The interpreting
statutes should provide for interpreters on the request of the deaf suspect
or next friend of the suspect; furthermore, appointing authorities should
be required to procure an interpreter when they observe that the suspect
cannot understand spoken words.150
The state interpreting statutes should not place the burden of re-
questing an interpreter on the deaf suspect alone; likewise, they should
not place too much discretion in the appointing authority.' 5 1 The ap-
pointing authority may exercise discretion and not appoint an inter-
preter under the erroneous belief that the suspect is understanding the
proceeding. Because the suspect cannot always communicate the re-
quest, mandatory appointment is necessary. The statutes should avoid
the possibility that the court will fail to appoint an interpreter simply
because the judge believes the testimony or proceeding is not crucial to
the question of the suspect's guilt or innocence.152 Even guilty suspects
are guaranteed the procedural safeguards of the Constitution, inter alia,
a trial by jury and the assistance of counsel.
The state interpreting laws generally provide that courts and other
officials should request interpreters from a state agency or association of
the deaf.153 Sixteen states require that interpreters meet some kind of
statutory qualifications ranging from standards established by the Na-
tional Registry of Interpreters 15 4 to the simple requirement that the in-
150 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE §§ 3, 5.
151 Some statutes place too much discretion in the appointing authority in determining the
need for an interpreter. South Carolina's interpreting statute, for example, provides for judi-
cial appointment of interpreters "unless the deaf person shall waive such or the judge shall
find that it is not necessary for the fulfillment ofjustice." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-27-110 (Law.
Co-op. 1976). Under this standard, ajudge who believes that an interpreter is not essential to
achieve justice could disregard the entire statute even where the deaf suspect cannot under-
stand the proceedings. See also ALA. CODE § 12-21-131 (1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 606-9
(1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15(b) (1982); VT. R. CRIM. P. 28 (1983).
152 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
153 Seven states provide that the court may request an interpreter from a particular state
agency that coordinates such requests. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 622B.4 (West Supp. 1982) (list
kept by "state department of health"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.035(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984)
(list kept by the "Missouri school for the deaf'); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-507(2) (1983) (list
kept by "state department of social and rehabilitation services"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 521-A:7 (Supp. 1979) (list kept by the "department of education," "New Hampshire associ-
ation of the deaf," and the "New Hampshire registry of interpreters for the deaf" [R.I.D.]);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-9-7 (Supp. 1983) (referrals from the "state vocational rehabilitation
division" or the "New Mexico registry of interpreters for the deaf"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-6
(1981) (list kept by the "State Department of Human Resources" and the "North Carolina
Council for the Hearing Impaired"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(e) (Supp. 1983) (lists kept
by the "Tennessee registry of interpreters for the deaf," the "Tennessee council for the hear-
ing impaired," and the "state department of education, division of vocational
rehabilitation").
154 Seven states require interpreters to meet the standards of the National Registry of In-
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terpreter be "able to communicate with the deaf suspect."1 55 The
interpreting statutes should explicitly define the qualifications required
for legal interpreters' 5 6 and provide for a state agency to coordinate in-
terpreter requests.1
5 7
Once the judge or appointing authority has located an interpreter,
some states also require the appointing authority to determine that the
interpreter is "readily able to communicate" with the deaf suspect.I5  It
is essential for the appointing authority to ensure that the deaf suspect
actually understands the interpreter. Twenty-seven states require the
interpreter to take an oath to make a true interpretation to the inter-
preter's best skill and judgment 5 9 and one state permits the judge to
terpreters for the Deaf (N.R.I.D.). See CAL. EVID. CODE § 754(c)(1) (West Supp. 1984); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90.6063(3)(b) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4001(2) (Supp. 1982);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 48(1)(G) (Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-A:l(IV)
(Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2408(2) (West Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-103(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
Three states have established state agencies that promulgate standards for interpreters.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-242(H) (West Supp. 1983) (requires certificate approved by the
Arizona council for the deaf); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-1(3)(1981) (standards established by the
"department of human resources"); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.31(f) (Vernon
Supp. 1982) (standards established by the "state commission for the deaf').
Two states have created state commissions to regulate certification of "interpreters who
have reached varying levels of proficiency in manual communication skills." ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 36-1941, 36-1946 (West Supp. 1975-83); TEx. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 81-
007 (Vernon 1980).
Two states allow court personnel to adopt standards of qualification for interpreters.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-149 (Supp. 1983) (standards adopted by the "Executive Secretary of
the judicial Department"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622B.1 (2) (West Supp. 1982) (rules adopted
by the "supreme court").
155 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.33 (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25.2404 (1979); OR.
REV. STAT. § 133.515(2)(b) (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.42.020 (Supp. 1983). The
Minnesota statute defines an interpreter as a person who is "readily able to communicate
with the handicapped person, translate the proceedings for him, and accurately repeat and
translate the statements of the handicapped person to the officials . MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 611.33 (West Supp. 1984).
156 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 2(c).
157 See infa MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 13.
158 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-202 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-6063(6) (West Supp.
1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-4002(c) (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4353(b) (1977);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-504 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-A:4 (Supp. 1979); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8B-2() (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(1),(2) (Supp. 1983).
159 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2101.1(d)(1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 751 (West Supp. 1977);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-203 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90-6063(7) (West Supp. 1983); GA.
CODE ANN. § 99-4005 (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE § 4-22-1-22.5(d) (1982); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 622B.5 (West Supp. 1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-270(B)(2) (West 1981); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 611.33(2) (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.035(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-4-508 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2405 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 50.053 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-A:10 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-9-9
(Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8B-7 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-33-04 (Supp. 1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.14(B) (1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1278(c) (,Vest
1958); R.I. GEN. LAws § 8-5-8 (1970); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-14-4.1 (1979); TENN.
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require such an oath. 60 These procedural safeguards help guarantee an
effective interpretation.' 6 1
Although the substantive and procedural guidelines for sign lan-
guage interpretation in the criminal process vary, one similarity exists:
all but a few of the states that provide interpreters in criminal proceed-
ings also provide for state or court compensation of the interpreter. 162
Some states may be reluctant to compensate interpreters, believing that
such compensation constitutes the use of public funds to aid private in-
dividuals.' 63 Compensation of interpreters to guarantee the deaf sus-
pects' right to understand the proceedings, however, should not differ
from compensation of court-appointed attorneys to guarantee indigent
suspects' right to the assistance of counsel. Interpreters also perform a
public service in conserving the time of judges and juries and increasing
trial efficiency, and therefore should be compensated by the state as are
court reporters, bailiffs, and other necessary personnel. 164 The interpret-
ing statutes should provide compensation for interpreting at all stages of
the criminal process and should establish a state agency to coordinate
interpreter compensation. 65
The state interpreting statutes lack enforcement provisions or in-
centives for the appointment of interpreters. With the exception of
eight states that exclude at trial a statement taken from a deaf suspect
without an interpreter present, 66 no penalties exist for criminal justice
officials who do not provide the deaf suspect with an interpreter as re-
quired by law. Officials, including judges, can and do ignore the inter-
preting statutes. 1 67 The interpreting laws should contain an
CODE ANN. § 24-1-103(o (Supp. 1983); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.31(e) (Vernon
Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15 (1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5811 (1973);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 2.42.050 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 57-5-7(e) (Supp. 1983).
160 ALA. CODE § 12-21-130 (1975).
161 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE §§ 6, 7(e).
162 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, and Massachusetts
provide for interpreters, see supra note 23, but lack the statutory mechanism to compensate
them.
163 In Myers v. County of Cook, 34 Ill. 2d 541, 542, 216 N.E.2d 803, 804 (1966), an action
by an interpreter for payment of fees, the County argued that the Illinois constitution prohib-
ited compensation of interpreters because it provides that "[t]he state shall never pay, assume
or become responsible for the debts or liabilities of, or in any manner give, loan or extend its
credit to or in aid of any public or other corporation, association or individual." ILL. CONST.
art. IV, § 20.
164 Myers, 34 I11. 2d at 543, 216 N.E.2d at 804. In Myers, the Illinois Supreme Court or-
dered payment of the interpreter's fees for these public service reasons. Id. at 543-44, 216
N.E.2d at 807-08.
165 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 13(h).
166 See supra note 36.
167 An interpreter in Chicago reported that courts often proceed in cases involving a deaf
suspect without an interpreter, commenting: "If they've got a case to hear, interpreter or no
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exclusionary clause' 68 and should mandate a retrial when deaf suspects
are denied interpreters to which they are entitled under the statute. 169
The exclusionary and retrial provisions, codifying appellate review, thus
would serve to make judges and police officials aware of the need to
provide interpreters to guarantee deaf criminal suspects' right to under-
stand the proceedings at all stages of the criminal process.
III. CONCLUSION
Deaf criminal suspects have the constitutional right to understand
the proceedings at all stages of the criminal process. Sign language inter-
pretation is essential to protect deaf suspects' rights to understand Mi-
randa warnings, police questioning, interrogation, notification of
charges, and criminal proceedings at court. States should adopt com-
prehensive interpreting statutes to assure that these rights are protected.
Protecting these constitutional rights by statute may not be enough
for deaf suspects, however. Judges, police officers, court personnel, and
attorneys also must be made aware of the special needs and concerns of
deaf suspects through awareness programs, information services, train-
ing programs, and review courses. The deaf suspects' constitutional
right to understand fully and participate in the proceedings at all stages
of the criminal process can be protected only when legislatures, judges,
and police officials work together to eliminate the legal handicaps of the
deaf.
IV. APPENDIX: MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE
170
1. To protect fully the constitutional rights of deaf persons and those
who are unable to understand or communicate spoken language, and to
ensure a full understanding of criminal proceedings and a full participa-
tion in the criminal process, this Act is hereby established.
2. Definitions. For the purposes of this Act,
(a) "Deaf" means those who cannot understand spoken words through
normal auditory processes.
(b) "Deaf person" means any witness, suspect, accused, detainee, de-
fendant, juror, complainant, victim, or interested party to the action
who cannot understand spoken words through normal auditory
processes.
(c) "Qualified interpreter" means a person with the knowledge and un-
interpreter, they'll go without you." Chicago Hearing Society Workshop, Chicago (Sept. 11,
1982).
168 See infra MODEL INTERPRETING STATUTE § 10.
169 Id
170 This Model Interpreting Statute borrows from several of the state interpreting statutes
discussed in this Comment.
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derstanding of the Code of Ethics of the National Registry of Interpret-
ers for the Deaf who is able to recognize the comprehension level of a
deaf or hearing-impaired person and is able to communicate effectively
in a mode of communication used by the deaf and to interpret accu-
rately the statements of the deaf person.
(d) "Appointing authority" means the person designated in section 4 of
this Act.
3. The appointing authority shall appoint a qualified interpreter of the
deaf sign language in the following instances:
(a) Whenever a deaf person requests an interpreter, unless the ap-
pointing authority finds such request is frivolous.
(b) Whenever the appointing authority recognizes that a witness, sus-
pect, accused, detainee, defendant, juror, complainant, victim, or any
interested party to the action cannot understand spoken words through
normal auditory processes.
(c) Whenever the parent, spouse, legal guardian, physician, or blood
relative of a deaf person requests an interpreter, unless the appointing
authority finds such request is frivolous.
4. A qualified interpreter of the deaf sign language shall be appointed:
(a) By the arresting officer or superior, to interpret the delivery of Mi-
randa warnings to a deaf person.
(b) By the interrogating officer or superior, to interpret the question-
ing of a deaf person in custody by police officers.
(c) By the attending officer or superior, to interpret any statement given
by a deaf person to police officers.
(d) By the official who appoints the attorney, to interpret conferences
between a deaf person and the court-appointed attorney, whenever such
attorney deems the conference to be essential to the deaf person's de-
fense to a criminal charge.
(e) By the police officer, judge, prosecutor, or other official, to interpret
the delivery of a criminal charge to a deaf person.
(f) By the court or the court's selected authority, to interpret the ar-
raignment of a deaf person.
(g) By the grand jury prosecutor or prosecutor's selected authority, to
interpret the grand jury examination of a deaf person.
(h) By the court or the court's selected authority, to interpret any court
proceeding at which a deaf person receives, pleads to, or defends a crim-
inal charge, including trials, hearings, and trial conferences, but not lim-
ited to these.
(i) By the hearing officer, to interpret any prison hearing, parole hear-
ing, or any other institutional hearing at which a deaf person is a witness
or principal party in interest.
5. Such deaf person, or the parent, spouse, legal guardian, physician,
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or blood relative of a deaf person, shall notify the appointing authority
at least one week (seven days) before the time of appearance listed in
section 4 of this Act regarding the request for an interpreter, unless such
notification is impossible. At no time shall an appointing authority
deny a deaf person the services of an interpreter for the lack of a request.
6. After procuring an interpreter, the appointing authority shall en-
sure that the deaf person can understand spoken words through the sign
language interpreter. If the deaf person remains unable to understand
spoken words, the appointing authority shall:
(a) Appoint an interpreter skilled in reverse interpreting to interpret
statements to and from the deaf person and the original interpreter, or
(b) Appoint an aural-oral interpreter, or
(c) Appoint a second interpreter.
7. The duties of the interpreter procured by the appointing authority
shall be:
(a) To establish communication with the deaf person.
(b) To interpret any and all Miranda warnings, police questions, threats,
or other communication with the deaf person.
(c) To establish that an interpreter was present for any concurrent re-
cording or record.
(d) To notify the appointing authority of any irregularities or gaps in
the interpreting with the deaf person.
(e) To take an oath, when interpreting for trial, hearing, questioning, or
other examination, that the interpreter will make a true and accurate
representation of the communication to the deaf person to the best of
the interpreter's skills and abilities.
(f) To maintain an active role in the profession of interpreting and
maintain an awareness of recent research, standards, improvements in
techniques, and ethics review.
8. A standard polygraph test may not be given to a deaf person.
9. If an interpreter communicates a statement that would be privi-
leged if the interpreter were not present, the privilege shall also extend
to the interpreter.
10. In the event that an interpreter is not provided as required under
the provisions of this Act, the statements taken in violation of section
4(a), (b), or (c) shall not be admissible in evidence in any court of this
state; proceedings conducted in violation of section 4(d), (e), (f), (g), (h),
or (i) shall be void and retrial or rehearing shall be set, unless the serv-
ices of an interpreter are rendered unnecessary under section 3 or section
11 of this Act.
11. A deaf person may not waive the services of an interpreter unless
the need for an interpreter is frivolous, as determined by the deaf person
acting with the approval of the appointing authority.
[Vol. 75
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12. If the deaf person cannot understand spoken words even with the
assistance of a qualified interpreter or special interpreter as specified in
section 6 of this Act, the court shall institute sign language training for
the deaf person with the cooperation of the secretary of the state depart-
ment of health and welfare and the court shall place the deaf person in
temporary custodial care with the cooperation of the state probation
officer.
13. This Act hereby creates a State Commission for Assistance to the
Deaf, which shall have the following duties:
(a) To maintain lists of active interpreters who have had or desire to
have experience in legal interpreting.
(b) To establish standards of competency, skill, and ethics for interpret-
ers to deaf persons, which standards shall be strictly enforced.
(c) To monitor the criminal justice system to ensure that the provisions
of this Act are adhered to and to ensure the availability of qualified
interpreters.
(d) To coordinate requests from appointing authorities for the services
of an interpreter under the provisions of this Act.
(e) To compile lists of frequency of interpreter requests.
(f) To establish and maintain public awareness programs to acquaint
citizens and attorneys with the problems and characteristics of the deaf.
(g) To establish and maintain police awareness programs, training pro-
grams, review courses, and information services to acquaint police of-
ficers and court personnel with the problems and the characteristics of
the deaf.
(h) To compensate interpreters utilized by the appointing authorities
under the provisions of this Act, based on a daily rate which shall be
determined by the State Commission for Assistance to the Deaf. The
Commission shall apply for reimbursement of funds from the County in
which the interpreter services are rendered.
JEFFREY B. WOOD
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